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HOW THE RIAA CAN STOP WORRYING AND
LEARN TO LOVE THE RICO ACT: EXPLOITING
CIVIL RICO TO BATTLE PEER-TO-PEER
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Recording Industry Association of America1 and its members
("RIAA") is currently involved in thousands of lawsuits2 attempting to
stem the tide of copyright infringement caused by users of peer-to-peer file
sharing ("P2P") networks . These include suits for direct4 and secondary
liability for copyright infringement 5 and litigation testing the RIAA's right
to subpoena the identity of P2P users.
6
The lawsuits are part of the RIAA's overall strategy to fight P2P that
also includes new legislation,7 education,8 amnesty agreements,9 and
1. RIAA, About Us, at http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2004)
(defining the RIAA as a trade group that represents record companies, which "create,
manufacture and/or distribute approximately ninety percent of all legitimate sound recordings
produced and sold in the United States").
2. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514-16 (1975) (holding that associations have standing to
seek injunctive or declaratory relief on behalf of its members, but not to seek monetary damages
if the claims of the members are not shared to an equal extent, based on individualized proof of
the facts and extent of injury).
3. Florida Court Sends RIAA Away, WIRED NEWS.COM (April 1, 2004) at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,62915,00.html?tw-wntophead_7 (stating that the
RIAA has sued almost 2,000 P2P users for copyright infringement to date). Although it is
arguable whether the branded versions of applications and protocols that enable P2P file sharing
networks are, themselves, networks, throughout this article, they are described by the term
"network." See infra Part II.C. (providing background on P2P technology).
4. See id.
5. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(The district court found P2P networks Grokster and Morpheus not liable for secondary copyright
infringement. The case has been appealed and arguments were heard by the Ninth Circuit on
February 3, 2004.).
6. See generally Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reversing lower court's denial of a motion to quash subpoenas
issued on behalf of RIAA seeking identities of P2P users).
7. Declan McCullagh, Hollywood Hacking Bill Hits House, CNET NEWS.COM (July 25,
2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-946316.html (discussing the RIAA's support of the
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promotion of online sales as a substitute for P2P infringement.' 0 The
RIAA has great incentive to ensure that its strategy succeeds. Independent
researchers estimate that the industry lost $700 million" from the sixty
million people using P2P file sharing networks in 2002.12 However, the
court battles thus far have garnered mixed results, leaving the major legal
issues unsettled.'
3
This comment will argue that the RIAA should exploit the civil
version of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") in its litigation strategy. RICO provides rich benefits for civil
plaintiffs that can greatly reduce the RIAA's legal expenses and avoid or
reduce the effectiveness of the legal challenges it currently faces.' 4 These
benefits include the ability to reduce the burden to prove the secondary
liability of P2P networks,' 5 to avoid the "staple article of commerce"
defense,' 6 to join scores of P2P users along with a network in a single
Berman Bill, H.R. 5211, which would permit copyright holders to use self-help measures to stop
copyright infringement through P2P networks).
8. John Borland, R!AA Files 80 New File-Swapping Suits, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 30,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5099738.html.
9. Id.
10. Benny Evangelista, R!AA Pursues 80 More /Suits Filed Against File Sharers Include 2
In Bay Area, S.F. CHRON. Oct. 31, 2003, at B 1, available at 2003 WL 3767040 ("RIAA President
Cary Sherman said the group's enforcement and education campaign was succeeding in raising
awareness of copyright law and driving users to new, record-industry sanctioned online music
services such as iTunes Music Store, Napster 2.0 and MusicMatch Downloads.").
11. Robert MacMillan, New RIAA Chief Seeks a Hit Single, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Sept.
5, 2003), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A29504-2003Sep5.
12. Evangelista, supra note 10.
13. Compare Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (holding that "liability for contributory
infringement accrues where a defendant has actual-not merely constructive-knowledge of the
infringement at a time during which the defendant materially contributes to that infringement")
with In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
Aimster's willful blindness of its users' direct infringement was a sufficient state of mind for
imposing liability).
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (2000) (establishing liberal venue requirements); id.
§ 1964(c) (mandating treble damages and attorneys' fees for private plaintiffs); Scheidler v. Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 411-12 (2003) ("RICO, which empowers both prosecutors
and private enforcers, imposes severe criminal penalties and hefty civil liability on those engaged
in conduct within the Act's compass.").
15. See generally infra Part III.B.4 (arguing that both conspiracy to violate RICO and aiding
and abetting a RICO violation require less evidence to prove than contributory infringement or
vicarious liability).
16.See generally infra Part III.B.4.c (contending that analogies to patent law, the basis for
extending the staple article of commerce doctrine to copyright law, will not support further
extension beyond contributory infringement).
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suit, 17 and to hold them all jointly and severally liable' 8 for treble damages
plus attorney fees. 19 This exploration of the advantages of using the civil
RICO Act for P2P copyright infringement will also warn of the dangers
that come from overindulging in RICO's generous benefits.
Part II provides the legal and technical backgrounds of three complex
subjects: RICO, copyright law, and P2P network technology. Part III
analyzes the use of RICO in P2P litigation. First, it demonstrates how to
charge a RICO complaint against a P2P network and its users. Then, it
addresses the strengths and weaknesses of adopting this strategy. Finally,
Part IV will conclude that the RIAA should employ RICO against P2P
networks but should only name the most egregious P2P users in its suits to
avoid crossing constitutional lines prohibiting grossly excessive judgments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Law
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 20  Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted
Title 17, the Copyright Act.2  The Act defines infringement as a violation
of "any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner." 22 This includes,
among other things, the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the
copyrighted work. 23  Thus, anyone who distributes or reproduces a
copyrighted work without permission has infringed on the owner's rights.
2 4
Some exceptions to this rule operate as restrictions on the owner's
exclusivity.25  One exception subjects the owner's exclusivity to the "fair
use" of the work by those that lawfully possess copies.26 Fair use includes
17. See United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that joinder of
codefendants involved in activities related to the RICO enterprise was proper if it tended to show
the existence of the enterprise).
18. See United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1507 (1 th Cir. 1986).
19. § 1964(c).
20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
21. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000).
23. Id. § 106(1), (3).
24. See id. (All works that are copyrightable but have not yet been registered are similarly
protected from infringement.).
25. See id. §§ 107-112, 117, 119, 121, 122.
26. § 107.
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purposes such as criticism, news reporting, and scholarship. 27 A court
considers several factors when determining whether an infringing activity
was a fair use. These include the purpose and character of the use, the
nature of the work, the proportional amount of the work used, and the
effect of the use on its market.
28
A copyright owner harmed by infringement has available a panoply of
both civil and criminal remedies.29 For example, civil plaintiff may sue for
actual damages, including lost profits, or for statutory damages that range
from $750 to $150,000 per work.30  Additionally, the court has the
discretion of awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.31
While the Copyright Act only defines direct infringement liability,
courts have developed two doctrines defining liability for the infringing
activities of another: contributory infringement and vicarious liability.32
Both of these secondary liability doctrines require plaintiffs to prove
elements additional to the primary infringement. For contributory
infringement, they must demonstrate that the defendant: (1) knew or had
reason to know of the direct infringement; and (2) induced, caused, or
materially contributed to that conduct.33 Vicarious liability for copyright
infringement requires plaintiffs to show that defendants had "the right and
ability to supervise the infringing activity and also ha[d] a direct financial
interest in such activities. 34
Congress enacted several amendments to the Copyright Act in the
1990s to combat a new threat stemming from the ease, speed, and quality
of digital media copies. 35 Among these were statutes that gave advantages
36to prosecutors in criminal copyright infringement cases. For almost
ninety years prior to the rise of the Internet, the requirements for criminal
infringement included that the defendant acted willfully and for the purpose
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433-34 & n.15 (1984).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(c).
31. Id. § 505.
32. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35.
33. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
34. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
35. See Aaron M. Bailey, Comment: A Nation of Felons?: Napster, the Net Act, and the
Criminal Prosecution of File sharing, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 473, 491-92, (2000).
36. Id. at 491-93 (citing, as examples, the Copyright Felony Act of 1992 and the No
Electronic Theft Act of 1997).
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of commercial advantage or private financial gain.37 In 1996, Congress,
concerned with organized crime's involvement in trafficking counterfeit
goods, passed the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act.3' The Act
increased the penalties for criminal copyright infringement and added this
offense to the list of predicate crimes under RICO.39
As a reaction to infringement through Internet "warez" sites,4 °
Congress enacted the No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act in 1997.41 The
NET Act eliminated the requirement of possessing a profit motive in
criminal copyright infringement where the retail value of works copied or
distributed is sufficiently high.42 The current statute requires prosecutors to
prove that the defendant either acted "for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain, '4 3 or that the value of the works
reproduced or distributed during a 180-day period exceeded $1,000.
44
B. RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act, entitled the "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,"
and commonly known as RICO.45 RICO provides prosecutors with
powerful tools to fight organized crime.46 Moreover, § 1964 of the Act
grants a civil remedy in federal court to "[a]ny person injured in his
37. See 4 MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 15.01 (Dec. 1998);
Bailey, supra note 35, at 489-90.
38. See Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996) (adding criminal copyright
infringement, 18 U.S.C. § 2319, to the list of RICO predicate offenses found at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(B)); NIMMER, supra note 37 at § 15.05(B).
39. Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386
(1996).
40. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994). See Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice Criminal Division, Federal Law Enforcement Targets International Internet
(Dec. 11, 2001), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/warezoperations.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004)
(A warez site is a website or bulletin board where visitors can download unlicensed copyrighted
works such as commercial computer programs and games. Warez sites store the works on a web
server unlike the Napster and P2P applications, which store the material on user's computers.).
41. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
43. Id. § 506(a)(1) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 506(a)(2) (emphasis added).
45. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Tit. IX, 84
Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000)).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (providing criminal penalties including fines, up to twenty years
imprisonment, and forfeiture of property connected to the violation); id. § 1965(a) (broadening
the general venue, service of process, and subpoena powers); id. § 1966 (expediting actions); id.
§ 1967 (permitting closed proceedings); id. § 1968 (permitting the attorney general to bypass
courts to order the production of evidence).
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business or property" by a violation of RICO.47 There are many attractive
benefits for successful civil RICO plaintiffs including treble damage
awards, mandatory cost and attorney fee awards, nationwide service of
process, worldwide personal jurisdiction (as long as the defendant has
minimum contacts with the United States),4 8  and broadened venue
provisions49 that supplement 50 the general venue statute. 51 Plaintiffs may
institute a civil RICO action in any district "in which such person resides,
is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs" whether or not the defendant
is a corporation.52
The Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress intended RICO to
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose. 53 It is equally
applicable to both legitimate and illegitimate businesses.54 Plaintiffs have
employed RICO in many forms of business litigation such as securities
fraud, corporate takeover, antitrust, real estate development, and
employment litigation.5 5
In addition to primary liability for RICO violations, Congress also
codified conspiracy to commit a RICO violation.5 6 Many federal circuits
also recognize a separate offense of aiding and abetting a violation of the
RICO Act.
5 7
47. Id. § 1964(c).
48. See BankAtlantic v. Coast to Coast Contractors, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 480, 488-89 (S.D.
Fla. 1996).
49. § 1965(a).
50. See The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat.
947 ("Nothing in [RICO] shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing
criminal penalties or affording civil remedies .... ").
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (stating that proper venue for a civil action not founded solely on
diversity may be brought "in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of
the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no
district in which the action may otherwise be brought.").
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
53. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (citing Pub. L. 91-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 947).
54. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981); see also Slattery v. Costello, 586 F.
Supp. 162, 164 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that criminal RICO precedents are equally applicable to
civil RICO cases where both share the same substantive law).
55. Tower C. Snow, Jr. & David Ledecky, Recent Developments In RICO Litigation, 378
PLILit 847, 852 (1989)
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000).
57. See generally infra Part IIt.B.4.b (examining three different jurisdictional interpretations
of the aiding and abetting cause of action).
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C. P2P Networks and Technology
There would be no P2P if it were not for MP3, the graciously short
acronym for Moving Picture Experts Group 1 Audio Layer 3.58 MP3 is
both a digital audio file format and a method of compressing digital audio
data. 9 It is the specific format of copyrighted work that is at issue in the
RIAA lawsuits. 60  "Ripping" is the popular term for the process of
converting a song from a CD into an MP3 file on a computer. 61 MP3
compresses relatively large music files into smaller files that can be
-transferred efficiently via the Internet while maintaining virtually pure
sound quality. 62 These two factors-speed and quality-led to the creation
and phenomenal growth of P2P networks.6 3
The "P"s in P2P stand for "peers"-the individual users (or nodes) of
the networks who upload and download MP3 files.64 P2P networks possess
three key features: (1) a program that allows users to locate other users; (2)
a method for searching for specific content; and (3) a process for
transferring files between users.
65
There are three varieties of P2P networks.66  Napster, which
epitomized the first generation of P2P, utilized a centralized, index-server
framework that maintained the location of all available MP3 files.67 When
users searched for a song, their request was sent to Napster's index-servers,
which returned the locations where the files were available.6 8 The user
.then completed the transaction by downloading the song directly from that
location.69  Centralized framework systems maintain client-server
functions.70 Since Napster maintained the centralized index-servers, it was
capable of exerting control over many variables such as the list of searches
58. Bailey, supra note 35, at 478-79.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 481-82.
61. Jeffrey L. Dodes, Comment, Beyond Napster, Beyond the United States: The
Technological and International Legal Barriers to On-Line Copyright Enforcement, 46 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 279, 287-88 (2002-03).
62. See Bailey, supra note 35, 478-79.
63. See id at 478-79, 481-82.
64. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 721 (2003).
65. Id. at 717-18.
66. Sandvine, Inc., Regional Characteristics Of P2P: File Sharing As A Multi-Application,
Multi-National Phenomenon, 7 (2003), available at http:/www.sandvine.com/solutions/pdfs/euro-
filesharing-Diffunique.pdf.
67. Id. at 8.
68. See id
69. See id
70. Id.
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that it permitted and the ability to bar users from the network.71
A second generation of P2P networks was intentionally developed to
evade secondary copyright infringement liability 2 by implementing a
decentralized framework.73 In a decentralized system, each node is both a
client and a server. 74 Users execute both searches and transfers through
other nodes in the network.75 Because these networks have few, if any,
centralized functions or control mechanisms-evidence showing secondary
copyright infringement liability in the Napster suit-they avoid liability.
76
However, the lack of centralized functions may also render this type of
network unstable and inefficient. 77 Examples of networks using this design
are eDonkey and the early version of Gnutella.78
The third generation of P2P networks is currently the most popular in
the United States and is characterized by networks using FastTrack
technology (Kazaa and Grokster). 79  FastTrack uses a controlled
decentralized framework-a hybrid of the two other varieties.8 °  The
system distributes the tasks of a centralized file server to a number of
supernodes-users selected dynamically by the network.81 Some functions
are centralized, but designers were careful not to create any control
mechanisms.82 For example, Kazaa maintains that it does not even have
the ability to shut down its own network.
83
D. The RIAA's Current Litigation
Two distinct classes of litigants are facing liability for copyright
infringement. The first class, individual users who are liable for primary
copyright infringement, have little incentive or ability to challenge these
71. Wu, supra note 64, at 728-30.
72. Id. at 731.
73. See Sandvine, supra note 66, at 8.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Wu, supra note 64, at 732.
77. Id.
78. See Sandvine, supra note 66, at 7-8.
79. See Wu, supra note 64, at 734-35.
80. Sandvine, supra note 66, at 8.
81. Id. See also Kazaa, The Guide, The Glossary, Participation Level, Supernodes,
KAZAA.COM at http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossa-y/supemodes.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2004) ("[U]sers with the fastest Internet connections and the most powerful computers are
automatically designated as Supernodes." Users search requests are sent through supernodes
which maintain indexes of available files.).
82. Wu, supra note 64, at 734-35.
83. Id. at 735.
2004] HOW THE RIAA CAN STOP WORRYING AND LEARN TO LOVE RICO 529
suits. Many such users are teenagers and college students 84 without the
resources (i.e., time or money) to mount an effective defense against the
overwhelming resources of the RIAA and its attorneys. The users'
incentive is low because the RIAA has been willing to settle suits well
below the statutory maximum limits.8 5  The cost of launching a defense
would likely be higher than the cost of settling. This leaves most users
with little incentive to attempt a defense. Additionally, incentive is low
because the RIAA's claims against users are for primary copyright
infringement, which is a strict liability tort that affords few defenses.86
At the other extreme are the P2P networks such as Grokster and
Morpheus. The RIAA is appealing a district court ruling granting the
motion of the defendants (Grokster and Morpheus) for summary judgment
in a suit for injunctive relief.87  The networks have a high incentive to
challenge the suits since a finding of liability could foreclose their ability to
do business.8 8 Unlike the users, the networks have a viable defense with a
greater likelihood of success. The RIAA bases its claims against the
networks on its interpretation of the judge-made law of contributory
infringement-a legal theory that remains uncertain in the context of P2P
file sharing networks.
89
IlI. How THE RIAA CAN IMPLEMENT A RICO SUIT
The RIAA's strategy, oversimplified, has been to fight hundreds of
easy cases against easy opponents and a few tough cases against tough
opponents. 90 It would have been a better strategy for the RIAA to combine
84. In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
85. Ted Bridis, Music Group Files 80 More Lawsuits Against Downloaders,
USATODAY.COM (Oct. 30, 2003), at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-10-30-riaa-80-
more x.htm (stating that defendants have settled for amounts ranging from $2,500 to $7,500).
86. United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Neb. 1991).
87. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000) (granting courts the power to issue "temporary and final
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright.").
89. Compare Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (holding that "liability for contributory
infringement accrues where a defendant has actual-not merely constructive-knowledge of the
infringement at a time during which the defendant materially contributes to that infringement.")
with Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650 (holding that Aimster's willful blindness of its users' direct
infringement was a sufficient state of mind for imposing liability).
90. See infra Part III.B. l.a. (users sued for civil copyright infringement are subject to a strict
liability standard); see also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036
(C.D. Cal. 2003); In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (The
lack of concordance between the Grokster and Aimster decisions demonstrates the difficulty in
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large numbers of users together in single suits, to reduce its burden of proof
in suits against networks, and to select the most hospitable jurisdiction to
hear its claims.
The RIAA could have achieved this if it had filed civil RICO claims
against all defendants. Although Congress enacted RICO as a tool to fight
organized crime, plaintiffs have employed it against a variety of legitimate
organizations. 91 Even music copyright holders have used RICO in at least
one suit against a P2P network. 92 Although no court ever heard the issue,
the band Metallica included RICO in its lawsuit against Napster in 2000.93
A. Issues That Must be Resolved to Keep the RIAA From Worrying
Two complicated issues effect whether or not RICO may constitute a
beneficial solution for the recording industry. The first is whether the
RIAA can tailor the loosely woven fabric of P2P networks-together with
their users-to fit an "enterprise" within the meaning of the RICO Act.
94
In cases such as Napster and Grokster, courts have been forced to grapple
with the problem of applying copyright law to infringement wrought by
new developments in technology. Similarly, if the RIAA employs RICO,
courts must determine whether an enterprise can be defined as much by the
design of software as the conduct of those who use it. There is no
precedent for showing that a virtual community of anonymous individuals
can satisfy the definition of an enterprise. However, case law has shown
that courts are inclined to interpret this requirement liberally.
95
The second issue is whether .courts would be granting too much
power to plaintiffs by allowing them to employ RICO. The Act mandates
treble damage and attorney fee awards.96 Courts established that joint and
applying both the contributory and vicarious liability standards, and the staple article of
commerce doctrine, to P2P networks.).
91. Tower C. Snow, Jr. & David Ledecky, Recent Developments in RICO Litigation, 378
PLI/Lit 847, 852 (1989).
92. Metallica v. Napster Inc., No. 00-0391 (Compl.) (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 13, 2000); see
also Jon Zahlaway, Napster Reaches Agreement With Metallica, Dr. Dre Following Latest Shut-
Down Order, LIVEDAILY.COM (July 12, 2001), at http://livedaily.com/news/3335.html (stating
that Metallica dropped its RICO claims as part of a settlement with Napster).
93. See id.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000) (defining "enterprise" as any "individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity").
95. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (citing Pub. L. 91-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 947) (stating that the statute shall be "liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes").
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
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several liability should be applied to all of the defendants within the same
enterprise. 97  A RICO enterprise comprised of P2P file sharers could
conceivably include thousands of primary and secondary violators. These
two fringe benefits of RICO could create a monstrous liability against those
defendants that have the misfortune of not being judgment-proof. The
question raised by such liability is whether Congress anticipated this result
when it redefined criminal copyright infringement and added this crime to
RICO's list of predicate offenses, or whether the conflict between these
laws was unintentional. An excessively large liability may influence a
court to find that it cannot expand copyright protections to P2P activity
without a clear mandate from Congress.98
Even if Congress foresaw inequitable effects, astronomical judgments
against defendants for committing minimal infringements may be
unconstitutional. Recently, the Supreme Court has struck down excessive
punitive damage awards99 and civil forfeitures,'00 signaling a trend limiting
awards grossly disproportionate to the conduct.
There is no accurate way to calculate how these issues will be
resolved because there are no precedents in the application of RICO to P2P
activity to base predictions. It is left to the copyright owners and the RIAA
to find an answer in court.
B. Establishing Civil RICO Liability in the Case of P2P File Sharing
If the RIAA decides to employ RICO against P2P users or networks,
it will need to prove four elements to establish a violation of the Act.
Plaintiffs must show: (1) "two or more predicate offenses"; (2) the
existence of an "enterprise"; (3) "a nexus between the pattern of
racketeering activity and the enterprise"; and (4) an injury to business
caused by the first three elements.1° While the meanings of terms such as
"enterprise" and "pattern" are vaguely defined in the statute,' ° 2 there is no
lack of case law to further delineate them. The precision of these
definitions is tempered by the fact that different judicial circuits often
97. See United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1507 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
98. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984);
United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Mass. 1994) (expressing judicial
reluctance to expand copyright law without the unambiguous direction of Congress).
99. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2003).
100. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (overturning the forfeiture of
$357,144 for a violation of a reporting offense punishable by a fine of $5,000).
101. VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2000).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(4), (5) (For example, the definition ofa "pattern of racketeering
activity" includes little substance beyond "at least two acts of racketeering activity .... ).
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maintain their own distinct versions. 103 This is not a detriment for
plaintiffs. In the case of P2P file sharing, where defendants are scattered
all over the nation, plaintiffs have the rare opportunity for unfettered forum
shopping since jurisdiction is available in any district where one of the
defendants resides.
104
1. Proving the Predicate Acts
The RICO Act requires, at minimum, proof of two predicate acts
within ten years of each other in order to establish a pattern of racketeering
activity.' °5  In the context of P2P, the first step in establishing a RICO
violation would be proving at least two acts of criminal copyright
infringement.
a. Elements of Criminal Copyright Infringement
In civil copyright infringement litigation, defendants are subject to a
strict liability standard, 10 6 with certain caveats such as a "fair use"
defense. 0 7  Under the civil infringement standard, "anyone who violates
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner" is liable for
infringement. 10 8  While criminal copyright infringement requires a more
rigorous effort to prove its elements,'0 9 this does not create insurmountable
obstacles for plaintiffs in P2P infringement cases as long as they select the
103. See Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 987, 995 n.60 (2003) (demonstrating the nine different forms that circuit courts of
appeal have developed to define the "continuity plus relationship" test for proving a pattern of
racketeering activity; see also id. at 999-1000 (stating that the circuits have not adopted a
uniform definition of "enterprise").
104. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460 (1990) (In addition to the district courts, state
courts retain the authority to adjudicate civil RICO claims.); see also Bryan, supra note 103, at
987 n. 1 (Furthermore, thirty-two states have adopted their own "little RICO" statutes. Although
plaintiffs may take advantage of the "little RICO" statutes in these states, or concurrent
jurisdiction in all state courts, these concerns are beyond the scope of this comment.).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000).
106. United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Neb. 1991).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
108. Id. § 501(a).
109. Id. § 506(a) ("Criminal infringement-Any person who infringes a copyright willfully
either - (1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or (2) by the
reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or
more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of
more than $1,000, shall be punished as provided under § 2319 of title 18, United States Code.
For purposes of this subsection, evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work,
by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement.").
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most prolific users as defendants.
To establish that a copyright infringing act is criminal, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that: (1) the plaintiff had valid copyrights for the
music uploaded or downloaded; 10 (2) which were infringed;1 11 (3) by the
defendant acting willfully; and (4) that the infringing activity was either
"for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or [was
effected] by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic
means" of copyrighted recordings valued at more than $1,000.112 It is
important to note that Congress, in the No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act,
1 13
changed the fourth element (as emphasized above), from the conjunctive to
the disjunctive. 14 Thus, it is not required to prove both the purpose of the
infringement and that the value of the infringed works exceeded $1,000. It
is enough to show one or the other, as long as the infringement was willful.
b. Willfulness
Assuming that the RIAA can satisfy the first two elements by
demonstrating that defendants infringed copyrights, it will then encounter a
more difficult test proving the third element-acting willfully. 15 There is
no definition of willfulness within the Copyright Act itself although the
term is included in the definitions of both criminal and civil
110. See id. § 4 10(c) (stating that registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of a
copyright); see also id. § 411(a) (permitting no action for infringement until the copyright is
registered).
11. Id. § 501(a). Infringement is defined, in part, as "a violation of any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner." When one P2P user downloads unlicensed music from another,
they have committed four acts of infiingement. The users have violated both the sound recording
and musical work rights, and the transfer is an unlawful reproduction and distribution of each
right. Id. § 106(1), (3); see id. § 102 (a)(2), (7).
112. See § 506(a) (alteration from original) (emphasis added).
113. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
114. See NIMMER, supra note 37, at (A)(1).
115. See Declan McCullagh, House Panel Approves Copyright Bill, CNET NEWS.COM
(March 31, 2004) at http://news.com.com/2100-1028-5182898.html (A House of Representatives
committee has approved the "Piracy Deterrence and Education Act" which would amend the
Copyright Act to facilitate enforcement of copyright infringement by P2P users.); see also Piracy
Deterrence and Education Act, (March 30, 2004) available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/content/legislation/hr4077/attachment, p. 14-15. (Among the
provisions of the bill is an "enhancement" of criminal copyright infringement (proposed as 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(3)) which would reduce the level of intent required to prove criminal
infringement by means of electronic distribution from "willfully" to "reckless disregard." If
enacted, the obstacle of proving willfulness, described in this section, will be eliminated, making
a civil RICO suit against users less doubtful.).
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infringement. 1 6 The Supreme Court has recognized the word's equivocal
meaning, describing willful as "a word of many meanings, its construction
often being influenced by its context.
' 17
Prior to the NET Act, interpretations of "willfulness" varied among
the circuit courts. The majority held that willfulness meant "the act was
committed by a defendant voluntarily, with knowledge that it was
prohibited by law, and with the purpose of violating the law."'1 18 Under this
view, a defendant's constructive (rather than specific) knowledge of
unlawful infringing acts was sufficient. 19 As an example, a defendant's
failure to observe and comply with a legible copyright notice while opening
a software container is evidence of willfulness.120 In contrast, the minority
view required only proof of intent to copy to show willfulness.1
21
The NET Act helped to clarify this issue by specifically stating that
reproduction or distribution in itself is not sufficient to prove willfulness,
specifically rejecting the minority view. 122 It also softened the majority
view that required proof of a specific purpose to infringe. NET Act co-
sponsor Rep. Howard Coble stated that "proof of the defendant's state of
mind" was not required to show willfulness. 123 Instead, it was sufficient to
prove that "the defendant acted with reckless disregard of the rights of the
copyright holder."' 4  Willfulness, he stated, could also be proven
contextually-"inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case."'
' 25
This all boils down to two minimum requirements to show
willfulness-the plaintiff must show that defendants: (1) had at least a
constructive knowledge of their infringement; and (2) that they nonetheless
acted with reckless disregard of the rights of the copyright holder. In a suit
against a P2P user, plaintiffs can show constructive knowledge by proving
that the user had possessed CDs that had valid copyright notices, and that
116. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(2) (2000) (increasing civil statutory damages up to $ 150,000
where the defendant acted willfully). See also id. § 506(a).
117. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1987); Moran, 757 F.
Supp. at 1049.
119. See United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 227 (8th Cir. 1995).
120. Id.
121. See United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1943); see also United States v.
Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd. 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976).
122. See § 506(a).
123. 143 CONG. REC. H 9884 (Nov. 4, 1997).
124. Id.
125. Id. But cf 143 CONG. REC. S 12689 (Nov. 13, 1997) (Remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch:
"Although there is ongoing debate about what precisely is the 'willfulness' standard in the
Copyright Act-as the House Report records-I submit that in the LaMacchia context 'willful'.
ought to mean the intent to violate a known legal duty.").
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the user disregarded those notices by ripping songs into MP3 files and
moving them into a P2P directory. Plaintiffs can demonstrate reckless
disregard contextually, as a matter of volume. While inadvertent or
infrequent infringement is not a criminal act, 126 evidence of 1,000 P2P
transactions by one user is likely a sufficient showing of a defendant's
reckless disregard.
A defendant might still invoke the "I didn't know it was illegal"
defense to defeat willfulness. Although ignorance of the law is typically
not a viable defense in a criminal prosecution, 2 7 this is not always true
with respect to complex statutory schemes normally regulated by civil or
administrative law. 128  In United States v. Moran,129 for example, the
defendant, who ran a video rental store, rented copies of his videos while
safekeeping the originals. 130  He claimed a good faith belief that this
practice was not copyright infringement as long as he did not rent both the
copy and the original. 131  The court held that Moran did not infringe
willfully because he had a good faith belief that this was a legal practice.132
While defendants, as in Moran, may plead their ignorance of the law
as a defense, two factors will weigh against P2P users who try to convince
a jury that their good faith ignorance was reasonable. First, ever since the
Napster litigation began in 2000,133 the illegality of P2P infringement and
the RIAA's battle against users and networks have received a considerable
amount of publicity. 134 It would be hard to believe that anyone using a P2P
network today is completely ignorant of the illegality of exchanging
copyrighted files. A jury would likely be skeptical of the credibility of
such claims. The second factor is volume. The more P2P files transacted,
126. See § 506(a) (copying must occur during any 180-day period and the works copied
must total a retail value of $1,000).
127. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 n.21 (1998).
128. See id. at 194 (stating that "highly technical statutes that presented the danger of
ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct" were exceptions to the rule and
required specific knowledge that defendant's conduct was unlawful). See also Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1991) (The Supreme Court held that a good faith misunderstanding
of the tax code negates willfulness but that this was a question of fact for the jury. "[T]he more
unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider
them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by
the ... laws.").
129. 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991).
130. See id. at 1047.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1052.
133. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
134. See id. at 1025 (In its decision, even the Ninth Circuit commented on the effects of the
publicity surrounding P2P litigation.).
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the less likely a jury will discover any innocence. And, since the RIAA has
an opportunity to choose the most willful defendants from a great pool of
P2P users, it will most likely succeed in proving this element.
c. Commercial Advantage or Private Financial Gain
The fourth element of criminal copyright infringement requires
plaintiffs to establish either that defendants possessed a punishable
purpose, or that they caused damages exceeding the threshold amount. 135 A
P2P user's purpose is chargeable when a defendant willfully infringes
copyrights "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain."' 136 It is not necessary that the defendant actually realize a profit from
the activity.' 37 The NET Act amended § 101 of the Copyright Act to define
"financial gain" as "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value,
including the receipt of other copyrighted works."'' 38 Some P2P networks
include quid pro quo functionality that demonstrates the expectation of
receipt of other works. For example, Kazaa limits a user's ability to
download files if the user fails to upload a sufficient quantity of files.'
39
Users upload MP3 files with the expectation of downloading new files.
This type of functionality that enforces a "good neighbor" policy provides
plaintiffs with ample evidence that P2P users infringe copyrights for
private financial gain.
d. Minimum Retail Value of$1,000
As an alternate to proving purpose, plaintiffs can plead that
defendants reproduced or distributed recordings worth more than $1,000.140
Specifically, the statute requires proof of "the reproduction or distribution,
including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more
copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). But see McCullagh, supra note 115 (A House of
Representatives committee approved the "Piracy Deterrence and Education Act" which would
amend the Copyright Act to facilitate enforcement of copyright infringement by P2P users.
Among other things, the bill would criminalize P2P activity by one that offers 1,000 or more
works for distribution without needing to prove the works' value.).
136. Id. § 506(a)(1).
137. Cross, 816 F.2d at 301.
138. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 stat. 2678 (emphasis added).
139. Kazaa, The Guide, The Glossary, Participation Level, at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/participation-ratio.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004)
("Basically, the more ... files you share, and are uploaded from you, the better your downloading
performance will be.").
140. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).
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retail value of more than $1,000.,,14 1 Meeting this threshold requirement
obviates the need to show a financial motive. It also can reduce plaintiffs
burden as long as the defendant transferred enough copyrighted files to
exceed this dollar amount with room to, spare. Legitimate music
downloading sites such as Apple's iTunes generally price files at around
one dollar per song. 42 Thus, over one thousand transactions would be
required to reach the criminal threshold.
The problem for plaintiffs employing the threshold dollar requirement
is that the amount can be susceptible to attack. Defendants may exclude
from their sum any files reproduced or distributed that are arguably a fair
use or are not copyrightable.1 43 This includes files in the public domain,
files downloaded repeatedly, files legally owned by users,' 44 files not
successfully downloaded or not operable,145 and spoof files uploaded by the
RIAA as part of its attempt to derail the P2P networks.146 This could allow
defendants to reduce the total retail value below $1,000 to negate
criminality. Thus, the best targets in this category are P2P users that have
downloaded well in excess of one thousand MP3 files.
2. The Existence of an Enterprise
After showing a sufficient number of predicate acts, plaintiffs must
prove that there was a nexus between the pattern of racketeering activity
and the RICO enterprise. 47 The Act defines "enterprise" as including "any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity. ',148 Because P2P users are not a legal entity and not a union, the
"associated in fact" enterprise is most fitting. The Supreme Court has
defined this as a "group of persons associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct."' 149  There are three
requirements. An association in fact "(1) must be an ongoing
141. Id. § 506(a)(2).
142. iTunes, Music Store, at http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2004)
("just 99¢ per song").
143. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
144. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652-53 (stating in dicta that downloading a copy of a CD that
is legally owned may be a fair use).
145. § 107 (showing factors determining a fair use).
146. See David Segal, A New Tactic in the Download War, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2002 at
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentld=A42239-2002Aug20&notFound=true.
147. VanDenBroeck, 210 F.3d at 699.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
149. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
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organization, (2) its members must function as a continuing unit, and (3) it
must be separate from the pattern of racketeering activity in which. it
engages."
150
There is considerable disagreement among the federal circuit courts
over the definition of enterprise, but all require that it must have some sort
of organizational structure,151 "however loose-knit., 152  Structure is the
quality "that separates 'organized' from 'disorganized' crime."' 5 3 "[T]here
need not be much structure, but the enterprise must have some continuity
and some differentiation of the roles within it."' 15 4 Thus, in United States v.
Ellison, the court held that a white supremacist group had sufficient
structure to be a RICO enterprise because the leader had the authority to
assign members to specific jobs and direct their activities.' 55
The hierarchical, organizational structure of P2P networks such as
Kazaa is evident on their websites. 156  At the top level is the network
itself.'57 Before users may use the network, they must agree to the terms
that the network establishes in an End User License Agreement
("EULA").'58 The networks also establish a hierarchy of users, determined
by a number of factors. Kazaa manages its network by automatically
designating some users as supernodes to act as go-betweens in transactions
between users. 59 In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the court found
that the use of supernodes by Grokster, which used Kazaa software, created
"a two-tiered organizational structure."' 60  Kazaa also establishes a
150. Frank v. D'Ambrosi, 4 F.3d 1378, 1386 (6th Cir. 1993).
151. Bryan et al., supra note 103, at 1000-01.
152. Bachman v. Bear, Steams & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999).
153. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being A Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 920, 974 (1987).
154. Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1995).
155. United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir. 1986).
156. Kazaa, The Guide, The Glossary, Participation Level, KAZAA.COM at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/participation-ratio.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004)
(establishing six participation levels: low, medium, high, guru, deity, and supreme being).
157. Kazaa, The Guide, End User License Agreement, KAZAA.COM at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/terms.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004) (explaining how users cannot use
the software without agreeing to the networks' terms).
158. Id.
159. Kazaa, The Guide, The Glossary, Participation Level, Supernodes, KAZAA.COM at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/supernodes.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004) ("[U]sers
with the fastest Internet connections and the most powerful computers are automatically
designated as Supemodes." Users search requests are sent through supemodes which maintain
indexes of available files). In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the court found that the use of
supernodes by Grokster, which used Kazaa software, created "a two-tiered organizational
structure."
160. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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association formed by a specific P2P network and its users, this definition
would not defeat the triad, for this association is neither the network nor the
users by themselves.
Moreover, this characterization of the enterprise would satisfy a
requirement of the majority of circuit courts that the enterprise must be
something different from the pattern of infringing activity.' 69  This
distinction is shown by the fact that there are both infringing and
noninfringing uses of the network. Kazaa, for example, makes available
"[1]icensed files, including computer games, music, videos and software
applications .. ,,7 Ironically, the P2P networks may be offering these
legitimate applications in an attempt to avoid contributory infringement
liability by showing that they are, like a videocassette recorder, a staple
article of commerce capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 71 However,
these same noninfringing uses provide RICO plaintiffs with the evidence
required to show that the enterprise is separate and distinct from the pattern
of racketeering activity.
The problem with employing this definition of the RICO enterprise is
that it is theoretical and defies proof in fact, leaving it vulnerable to
challenge. It describes a virtual enterprise where all users are connected to
each other through traceable P2P activity such as uploads, downloads and
searches. In reality, there may be no practical way to sort through the
millions of file sharing transactions and prove that there is only one
enterprise of Kazaa users, or that each node on the network has some sort
of interconnection to each other node. Even if plaintiffs produced evidence
linking file transfers (directly or through intermediaries) between one
hundred users, this would not prove that all Kazaa users are connected
through any number of degrees of separation.
However, plaintiffs can show sufficient evidence to infer that only a
single enterprise of P2P sharing exists. The P2P software applications
begin operating by connecting a new user to others that are already using
169. Bryan et al., supra note 103, at 1002 n. 109 (stating that every circuit except the second
and eleventh has adopted the view that a RICO enterprise must be separate and distinct from the
pattern of racketeering activities); see also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 ("While the proof used to
establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not
necessarily establish the other. The 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity'; it is an
entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an
enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved ....").
170. Kazaa, Sharman Networks Launches Kazaa v2.5, KAZAA.COM, at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/news/2.5_launch.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
171. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (holding that such a staple article of commerce is immune
from liability for contributory copyright infringement).
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hierarchy among users based on their contribution to other users.1 61 Kazaa
gives extra network privileges to users that give (by uploading) more than
they take (by downloading). 162 The organization of the network, including
the differentiation of the roles between the network, supernodes, uploaders,
and downloaders, may be enough evidence of structure to separate it from
those conspiracies of equal offenders that would not fall under RICO
jurisdiction.
The "ongoing relationship" requirement for an association in fact
requires proof that unlicensed file transfers between users on Kazaa occur
more often than sporadically, and pose a threat of continued infringement
activity. 63 With millions of users completing transfers daily, this will be
simple to establish. 64  Evidence that users regularly use the network is
proof that they act as a continuing unit, the second requirement of an
association in fact. 165 RIAA spokespersons stated that the users it has sued
exchanged an average of more than 1,000 copyrighted files. 66  This is
sufficient evidence to prove that the users are a continuing unit.
However, it would be a mistake to classify Kazaa as a RICO
enterprise if it is also a defendant.' 67 The nexus required by RICO's third
element is a relationship between three different parts: defendant,
enterprise, and pattern of racketeering activity.' 68 If the enterprise is also a
defendant, there can only be a nexus between two parts. Thus, plaintiffs
cannot define the enterprise as the individual users, the P2P network, or the
pattern of activity by itself. Any of these options would defeat the triad
relationship. However, if the plaintiffs characterize the enterprise as the
161. Kazaa, The Guide, The Glossary, Participation Level, KAZAA.COM at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/participation-ratio.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003)
(establishing six participation levels: low, medium, high, guru, deity, and supreme being).
162. Id.
163. See H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989) ("The continuity
requirement is ... satisfied where it is shown that the predicates are a regular way of conducting
defendant's ongoing legitimate business .... or of conducting or participating in an ongoing and
legitimate RICO 'enterprise."').
164. See Piracy Deterrence and Education Act, (March 30, 2004) available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/content/legislation/hr4077/attachment, p. 2 (The proposed bill
includes Congressional findings that over two million users of the most popular P2P system,
assumedly Kazaa, are online at any time, and that users of all P2P networks exchange over two
billion digital media in an average month.).
165. Id.
166. Associated Press, Music Industry Settles 52 Lawsuits, CBSNEWS.COM (Sep. 30,
2003), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/30/tech/main575823.shtml.
167. Trustees of Boston Univ. v. ASM Communications, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73 (D.
Mass. 1998) (stating that an overwhelming number of courts have held that the "person"
engaging in the pattern of racketeering activity must be an entity distinct from the "enterprise").
168. See id; see also Bryan et al., supra note 103, at 991.
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that network. 172 Thus, new users cannot initiate a separate enterprise of
interconnected file sharing activity without first connecting to an existing
enterprise. Unless the software application provides some method to
operate without first connecting to existing users, each new user must join
the same network that the first two users originated. Acceptance of this
theory may require a jury to make a leap of faith. In a criminal RICO case
where the prosecutor's burden is to prove a violation beyond a reasonable
doubt, 7 3 the leap may be too far. However, civil RICO claims only require
a preponderance of the evidence. 174 There should be enough evidence to
meet this standard. Yet, if plaintiffs fail with this definition of a virtual
enterprise, they can fall back on an alternative pleading of an enterprise of
users that are interconnected in fact.
175
3. Nexus Between the Pattern of Racketeering Activity and the Enterprise
Before determining whether there is a nexus between the pattern of
racketeering activity and the enterprise, it is necessary to verify that such a
pattern exists. As stated above, the statutory minimum number of acts
needed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity is two.' 76 However,
"while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient" since "two of
anything do not generally form a 'pattern."", 177 Further, a mere showing of
multiple predicate acts is "insufficient to prove a pattern."' 178  To
demonstrate a pattern, plaintiffs must prove relatedness and continuity:
"that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or
pose a threat of continued criminal activity."'
179
Factors that show evidence of relatedness include whether the
predicate acts involve "similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events."' 80 The millions of acts of P2P
copyright infringement are far from being isolated events. Plaintiffs can
172. See Wu, supra note 64, at 721.
173. Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof was appropriate in civil RICO cases).
174. Id.
175. See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a
pleading describing the enterprise as each of the defendants "individually, collectively and in any
combination" was sufficient to plead the enterprise in the alternative).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
177. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
178. Kenda Corp. v. Pot O'Gold Money Leagues, Inc., 329 F.3d 216, 233 (1st Cir. 2003).
179. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
180. Id. at 240.
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prove the other factors by showing the similarity of each infringing act:
creating an MP3 file from a copyrighted song, then uploading the file, and
allowing it to be downloaded by another user. The infringing acts of P2P
users are also related if the users participate through non-isolated, repeated,
and similar acts of uploading and downloading.18' These acts are related
further by their dependency on each other. Files must be uploaded
(infringing on distribution rights)' 82 before they can be downloaded
(infringing on reproduction rights).183 Two actors must work together with
a similar purpose in mind to complete the transaction. This will satisfy the
"relatedness" test.
The Supreme Court has suggested ways of proving the continuity
requirement.' 84 For example, it might be shown "that the predicates are a
regular way of conducting [the P2P network] defendant's ongoing
legitimate business (in the sense that it is not a business that exists for
criminal purposes), or of conducting or participating in an ongoing and
legitimate RICO 'enterprise."",1
85
P2P networks have both infringing and noninfringing purposes and
hold themselves out to be legitimate businesses. The infringing uses of
P2P enhance the revenue derived from noninfringing usage. Kazaa, for
example, earns income from advertising on its sharing application, and
from selling an "ad free" version of the application.' 86 The more content
available, infringing and noninfringing, the more revenue the company will
earn.187 Plaintiffs can argue that infringing files are a substantial part of the
regular way that P2P networks conduct business. Further, P2P users
regularly participate in this business by uploading and downloading
infringing files. Plaintiffs should easily succeed in showing that a pattern
of racketeering exists.
After establishing an enterprise and a pattern, plaintiffs must relate
both of these to the defendant in order to establish the necessary nexus.
188
Section 1962 (a), (b), and (c) of the RICO Act define three types of
181. See id. (detailing factors that determine "relatedness").
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
183 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
184. See id. at 241-43.
185. Id. at 243.
186. Kazaa, About Us, News, 'KAZAA PLUS' Launched, KAZAA.COM (Aug. 28, 2003), at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/news/kazaaplus.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
187. See generally Amy Harmon, Marketers Try to Turn Web Pirates Into Customers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at C I (discussing how unauthorized downloads are being used as a vehicle
to sell legitimate material).
188. VanDenBroeck, 210 F.3d at 699.
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relationships that are considered prohibited activities. 189 The first prohibits
investment from racketeering activity in any enterprise that affects
interstate commerce. 90 The second prohibits any person from acquiring an
interest in any enterprise affecting interstate commerce through
racketeering activity. 9 The third, § 1962(c), is the most applicable to P2P
file sharing. It provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
192
This provision can be broken down into two parts. First, the
defendant must be a person employed by or associated with the enterprise.
The second part is more complex. The Supreme Court labored to discern
the meaning of § 1962(c) in Reves v. Ernst & Young'193 and concluded that
"one is not liable under that provision unless one has participated in the
operation or management of the enterprise itself.'' 194 Under the "operation
or management" test,195 liability is not limited to those with primary
responsibility within the enterprise but extends to all who have "some part
in directing the enterprise's affairs."' 196 Nor is liability limited to upper
management, but also reaches "lower rung participants in the enterprise
who are under the direction of upper management" and "others 'associated
with' the enterprise who exert control over it."'
97
Reves presents problems for P2P plaintiffs in developing an effective
litigation strategy. If both the users and the networks are alleged to be
principals in the enterprise, then the users may fail the "operations or
management" test. Networks, not users, are upper management. It is the
networks that design the operation of the P2P application software in a
manner that provides the incentives and security measures that facilitate
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c) (2000). The fourth subsection, § 1962(d), defines the
separate offense of conspiracy and will be discussed below within Part 4.
190. § 1962(a).
191. § 1962(b).
192. § 1962(c).
193. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
194. Id. at 183 (developing the "operation or management test" after retreating to the
Congressional Record, case law, law review articles, and a dictionary).
195. Id. at 179.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 184.
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copyright infringement. 98  Users act independently and not under the
direction of upper management, and it would be difficult to show how
individual users exert any control over the network. However, if plaintiffs
allege that the users are the only principals while networks are liable
secondarily, then there is less disagreement that the users are operating or
managing the enterprise. Since the illicit business of the RICO enterprise is
copyright infringement, users are conducting the affairs of the enterprise by
unlawfully exchanging copyrighted material. This would show that users
pass the Reves test but still leaves the plaintiffs with the task of proving the
secondary liability of the networks.
4. Secondary Liability for Civil RICO Violations
Secondary violators of the RICO Act are just as liable for damages as
primary violators.' 99 If secondary liability provides an easier path to a
court victory, there is no reason not to pursue it. Depending on the facts
and circumstances of a defendant's involvement with the enterprise,
allegations of conspiracy to violate the RICO Act or aiding and abetting a
RICO violation may provide such a route. This is true for proving the
liability of both P2P networks and their users, but the focus here is on the
networks.
a. Conspiracy to Violate RICO
P2P plaintiffs will find that conspiracy is the easiest path to finding
the networks liable for a RICO violation. Congress codified a separate
offense in § 1962(d) that prohibits conspiring to violate any of the other
provisions of § 1962: (a), (b), or (c). 200 There are essentially two required
elements: agreement and knowledge.20 1  There is no requirement that
conspirators directed the affairs of the enterprise, i.e., that they pass the
Reves "operations or management"9 test.20 2 There is also no requirement to
prove that the conspirator committed a predicate act.20 3 There is not even a
need to prove that anyone ever consummated a predicate act since
198. See infra Part III.B.4.b.
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000) (aiding and abetting); § 1962(d) (conspiring to violate the
RICO Act.).
200. § 1962(d); see also Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (holding that there
is no "overt act" requirement).
201. See United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989).
202. See Bryan, supra note 103, at 1009.
203. See Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 537-38 (3d Cir. 2001).
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204conspiracy is an inchoate offense. It is the "distinct evil" of the act of
conspiring that creates liability.z 5
The agreement to commit a predicate act need not be formal or
express but may instead be only tacit .2 6 It can be an agreement to facilitate
the commission of a predicate act or an agreement to "facilitate only some
of the acts leading to the substantive offense. '0 7 Similarly, the knowledge
requirement is very liberal. A RICO conspiracy only requires knowledge
of the "general nature of the enterprise and that the enterprise extends
beyond his individual role. 20 8
Plaintiffs can use a conspiracy theory to find networks liable for
RICO violations. In P2P enterprises, there are both formal agreements and
tacit agreements. Users make formal agreements with P2P networks
through acceptance of a EULA. 20 9 Despite any disclaimers within these
agreements regarding copyright infringement, the networks should
reasonably know why users agree to EULA terms. The false piety of the
disclaimers is obvious-the networks provide the necessary lip service as
its users read the "warnings," wink back, and click the agreement.
The most important reason for using the conspiracy cause of action is
that it only requires the network to understand the general nature of the
RICO enterprise. Networks must be well aware of the substantial
infringing uses of their networks. If the RIAA claims that networks have
conspired to violate RICO, it will avoid the constructive knowledge versus
specific knowledge controversy between the Aimster and Grokster
decisions. The RIAA will only need to prove the barest form of
constructive knowledge, greatly reducing its burden of proof.
210
204. See United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1992).
205. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65.
206. See Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828.
207. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65.
208. Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828.
209. See, e.g., Kazaa, The Guide, End User License Agreement, KAZAA.COM, at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/terms.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
210. See Aimster 334 F.3d at 649-50 (The Seventh Circuit, interpreting the Sony and
Napster decisions, held that Aimster's willful blindness of its users' direct infringement, i.e.,
constructive knowledge, was a sufficient state of mind for imposing liability); see Grokster, 259
F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (The Ninth Circuit, also interpreting the Sony and Napster decisions, held that
"liability for contributory infringement accrues where a defendant has actual-not merely
constructive-knowledge of the infringement at a time during which the defendant materially
contributes to that infringement." Compare two requisite levels of knowledge with that required
in a RICO action: plaintiffs must only show that the P2P network understood the general nature
of the enterprise.).
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b. Aiding and Abetting
Another way to establish the secondary liability of networks is to
show that they have aided and abetted a RICO violation. Courts have taken
three different approaches in applying aiding and abetting to RICO. The
premise of the first approach is that it was Congress' intent that RICO
would not supersede other federal laws.2 1  Since the federal aiding and
abetting statute (defining one who aids or abets as a principal) is applicable
to all crimes against the United States,
2 12 it must be applicable to RICO.
21 3
In the few courts that adhere to this view, plaintiffs would only need to
prove that a P2P network aided and abetted a RICO violation by a user.
In contrast, the second approach argues that a RICO aiding and
abetting violation cannot be valid because Congress did not include it when
it codified the separate RICO offense of conspiracy.21 4 Through rules of
statutory construction, the inclusion of conspiracy charges meant the
exclusion of aiding and abetting.21 5 Further, the Supreme Court, in Reves,
indicated that aiding and abetting is not applicable to a violation of §
1962(c).
2 16
The third and most tenable approach is that aiding and abetting is
applicable for RICO purposes, but limited to the predicate acts.2 7 Since
the federal aiding and abetting statute applies to all offenses against the
United States, including criminal copyright infringement,21 8 aiding and
abetting such offenses is as much a predicate act as operating as the
principal. 1 9 Seemingly, this would permit application of aiding and
abetting to criminal copyright infringement.
211. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 947
(1970) ("Nothing in ... [RICO] shall supersede any provision of Federal, State or other law
imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies .... ").
212. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.").
213. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 29 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Aiding and abetting liability
is inherent in every federal substantive crime.").
214. See Pa. Ass'n of Edwards Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 843 (3d Cir. 2000); see
also In re Mastercard Int'l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 494-95 (E.D. La. 2001).
215. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418 (1998).
216. Reves, 507 U.S. at 178 (stating in dicta that "within the context of § 1962(c),
'participate' appears to have a narrower meaning" than aiding and abetting).
217. See In re Am. Honda Motor Co., 958 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 (D. Md. 1997); see also
Aetna Casualty Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1560 (1st Cir. 1994) (interpreting
§ 1961, the list of crimes defined as predicate acts, to include aiding and abetting).
218. See United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 841 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming convictions
for aiding and abetting criminal copyright infringement under the federal aiding and abetting
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
219. Am. Honda, 958 F. Supp. at 1058.
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Plaintiffs in jurisdictions that have adopted this theory must also
prove that the defendants pass the "operations or management" test.
220
This should not be a high hurdle, as networks in every sense operate and
manage the enterprise; they have a role in directing its affairs, and they
exert control over it.
221
Having established that aiding and abetting could be a viable cause of
action in some jurisdictions, it is necessary to examine its meaning. Under
18 U.S.C. § 2(a),222 plaintiffs must prove "that [the defendant] became
associated with a criminal venture and participated in this venture. 223
Association requires that the defendant shared the same intent as the
principal. 4 Participation requires the defendant to have "engaged in some
affirmative conduct designed to aid the venture. 225
RICO aiding and abetting case law shows that intent may be proved
by a reasonable inference that defendants intend the natural and probable
consequences of their intentional acts or conscious omissions.226 Under
this approach, plaintiffs can establish a P2P network's intent requirement
by showing specific acts of the network's designers to promote copyright
infringement, such as developing its software in a manner to shield the
network and its users from civil copyright infringement liability,
developing "security" measures to prevent infringers detection, and
designing features that encourage users to supply content of any sort.
2 27
Napster, with a centralized index-server, was a more efficient and
stable system than second and third generation systems.228 Yet these
centralized functions gave Napster too much control over its users'
220. See id. at 1059.
221. See supra Part III.B.3 (stating that the networks design the software in a manner that
provides incentives and security measures to facilitate copyright infringement); see also Kazaa,
End User License Agreement, supra note 209 (stating that Sharman Networks, Kazan's
manufacturer, maintains the right to grant users the ability to use the network, to restrict the users
conduct relative to the use of the software, and to terminate that ability if users do not abide by
the provisions of Kazaa's license agreement). Lest there be any doubt that Kazaa exercises
control over its network, the company filed suit against the RIAA claiming that it had violated the
EULA and infringed on Kazaa's copyright of its software. See Associated Press, Makers of
Kazaa Suing Record Labels, (Sep. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/biztech/09/24/kazaa.sues.ap/index.html.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
223. United States v. Vasquez, 953 F.2d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1992).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. United States v. Graham, 858 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1988).
227. See Wu, supra note 64, at 717.
228. See id. at 728.
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infringement, leaving it vulnerable to secondary infringement liability.
2 29
There is no reason to decentralize functions that improve network
efficiency other than to avoid liability.
230
In addition, P2P networks have added "security" functions that are
further measures to safeguard users from liability. Examples include using
proxy servers to hide user addresses, 231 and disabling functions that had
allowed investigators to discover all of the files in a user's sharing folder.
232
Additionally, the promotion of quidpro quo policies that restrict users who
do not upload enough content, further promotes the illicit aims of the
enterprise. These policies ensure that there is an ample supply of
downloadable content. While these policies may seem to be license-
neutral, consider what sources of unlicensed content (e.g., copyrighted
music on CD) compared to legal content (e.g., works in the public domain
on CD) might be available to an average user to upload. The networks
must have known that the natural and probable consequences of their
features and system design would promote the infringing acts of their users.
The same acts that show a network's intent also demonstrate that the
networks "engaged in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the
venture." 233 Hence, it also establishes proof of the participation element.
c. The Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine Does Not Apply to Aiding
and Abetting or Conspiring to Violate the RICO Act
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,2 34 the
Supreme Court borrowed the "staple article of commerce" doctrine from
the Patent Act's statutory definition of contributory infringement2 35 and
applied it to copyright contributory infringement.236  This doctrine
immunizes parties that distribute products from claims of contributory
infringement, where the products provide a means for others to infringe but
are also "capable of substantial noninfringing uses., 237 For example, the
229. See id. at 731-34.
230. Id
231. Press Release, Morpheus.com, New Morpheus TM 3.3 File-Sharing software Increases
Advanced Security and Privacy Protection (Aug. 26, 2003) available at
http://www.streamcastnetworks.com/08-26-03-morph33.html.
232. Kazaa, Privacy, Respecting Your Privacy - Privacy Protection Tools, at
http://www.kazaa.con/us/privacy/respecting_your_privacy.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
233. Vasquez, 953 F.2d at 183.
234. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
235. See id. at 440 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) of the Patent Act).
236. Id. at 442.
237. Id.
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Court found that Sony was not liable for the infringing activity of those that
owned their videocassette recorders because the machines were capable of
both infringing uses and substantial noninfringing uses.238 In extending the
doctrine from patent law to copyright law, the Court justified its reliance by
citing the similar purpose of both areas to strike a balance between the right
holder's "legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-
protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely
to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. 239
Defendants used this doctrinal defense in two P2P contributory
infringement cases; it was unsuccessful in A&M Records v. Napster,
Inc.,2 40 but later succeeded in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster.241 Despite
this history of application in P2P suits, it would be difficult to extend the
"staple article of commerce" doctrine further to afford protection under
RICO due to its dissimilar calculus of liability and RICO's competing
interest of fighting organized crime.
If a court were to turn again to patent law, it would find that the
"staple article of commerce doctrine" only appears- in the definition of
contributory infringement at § 271(c) and not in the separate action, under
§ 271(b), of aiding and abetting an infringement.2 42  This has been
interpreted to mean that the doctrine does not apply to aiding and
abetting.243 Likewise, there is no basis for applying the doctrine to a
conspiracy claim, as courts have not recognized a conspiracy cause of
action for patent infringement. 244 Thus, a court could not justify, as the
Supreme Court did in Sony, transplanting patent law into the realm of
copyright.
Second, the purpose of RICO, a measure designed to eradicate
organized crime, 45 upsets the balance struck between protecting the
238. Id. at 456.
239. Id. at 442.
240. 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
241. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
242. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (defining a separate cause of action for aiding and abetting:
"Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.").
243. Calhoun v. State Chemical Mfg. Co., 153 F. Supp. 293, 301 (N.D. Ohio 1957) (stating
that § 271(c), cited in Sony, "exempts the seller of staple articles of commerce from liability for
contributory infringement... [but] no such exemption from liability is granted to one who
actively induces the infringement.").
244. ENM Co. v. Transformer Mfrs., Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 144 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(holding that "there is no statute in the Federal laws concerning patents which give rise to a cause
of action for 'conspiracy.').
245. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23, ("It is the
purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal
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copyright holder's monopoly and the rights of those engaging in unrelated
areas of commerce.246 The desire, in our society, to permit access to the
noninfringing uses of P2P file sharing may not override both the need of
protecting copyrights and the necessity of fighting organized crime. Before
a court can simply transplant a carefully drawn doctrine of civil copyright
infringement into such a far-reaching statute as RICO, it must first
cautiously consider the criminal and civil implications, both within and
without the context of P2P. Since there is no justification from patent law
for establishing a new application of the doctrine, it is doubtful that a court
would permit defendants to use it as a defense.
5. Damages to Business Caused by the Enterprise's Activity
Any person or persons have standing to assert a RICO claim in a
district court if they were "injured in [their] business or property by reason
of a violation of § 1962.,,247 The injury must be one caused by specific
RICO predicate acts248 of racketeering rather than by the pattern of
racketeering activity.249 In the case of conspiracy liability, plaintiffs must
prove damages caused by predicate acts; it is not sufficient to show
damages caused by the conspirator's overt acts.25° Plaintiffs must show
both cause-in-fact and proximate cause.25'
The RIAA can establish causation and injury by showing that, but for
the actions of the networks, individuals associated with the enterprise
would not have uploaded or downloaded copyrighted files, thus violating
the exclusive rights of RIAA associates. This would constitute evidence of
specific harm by specific acts of copyright infringement. There is also
general evidence that P2P activity caused $700 million dollars of lost sales
to the recording industry. 252  To show proximate cause, plaintiffs may
assert that the risk of infringement was a foreseeable consequence of
defendants' actions.
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime.").
246. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
248. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 ("Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a
violation of§ 1962(c) will flow from commission of the predicate acts.").
249. Id. at 495 ("We are initially doubtful about a requirement of a 'racketeering injury'
separate from the harm from the predicate acts.").
250. Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 505 (2000).
251. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272-75 (1992).
252. Jay Lyman, Forrester Report Says Downloads Will Replace Discs, TechNewsWorld
(Sep. 3, 2003) at http://www.technewsworld.com/perl/story/31490.html (citing independent study
by Forrester Research).
2004] HOW THE RJAA CAN STOP WORRYING AND LEARN TO LOVE RICO 551
C. Learning to Love RICO: The Benefits of Using Civil RICO in P2P
Litigation
In addition to the reduced burden of proof discussed above, RICO
affords a number of other legal benefits. First, the RICO Act includes
special procedural rules that supplement the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 53 It provides nationwide service of process, eliminating the
need to show a defendant's minimum contacts with any particular state.25 4
Although service of process may not be performed outside the United
States, foreign corporations with agents within the borders may be served
here.255 Venue is proper in any district where any defendant may be found,
where it has an agent, or where it transacts business.256 Since the RIAA
may select defendants from among millions of P2P users, it is likely that
there is a potential defendant in every federal district. This provides
plaintiffs with an unrestrained opportunity for forum shopping. The RIAA
could select any district court in any circuit where it is most likely to get a
favorable ruling on its most contentious issues. There is no need to show
the minimum contacts of defendants in a RICO suit and subject matter
jurisdiction is available in any federal court 257 or in state courts, which have
concurrent jurisdiction.258
Second, RICO has special awards for compensation. In place of
punitive damages, RICO grants successful plaintiffs treble damages.259 On
top of this, RICO requires the mandatory payment of reasonable attorney's
26fees and court costs to the winning party. 60 Without RICO, these awards
in copyright infringement cases are merely discretionary.26'
Third, P2P plaintiffs may join as a defendant any person who is a
member of the RICO enterprise or related to the enterprise as an
253. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 947
("Nothing in... [RICO] shall supersede any provision of Federal, State or other law imposing
criminal penalties or affording civil remedies.").
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (2000); see also Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Landmark Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 321, 325 (D. Kan. 1987) (interpreting § 1965(a) as providing
nationwide service of process).
255. Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 982, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
256. § 1965(a) ("Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may
be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides,
is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.").
257. See id
258. See DuBroffv. DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557, 562 (5th Cir. 1987).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
260. Id.
261. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
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accomplice or co-conspirator.262 This allows for a very large number of
defendants. A suit against users of Kazaa, for example, has the potential of
including millions of defendants.2 63 Such joinder will greatly reduce costs
for the RIAA because it avoids litigating hundreds of separate cases spread
throughout the nation by combining all suits into a single action.264 One
way of dealing with the sheer enormity of that suit is through a defendant
class action suit.265 Although users may opt out of the class, 266 by doing so
they may be leaping from the frying pan into the fire, for the RIAA can
then sue each escapee separately for copyright infringement claiming
greater damages. The plaintiff has a very low burden of proof in simple
infringement cases against P2P users267 so there is no advantage to dodging
the class except perhaps to avoid the effects of joint and several liability.
In United States v. Caporale, the court held that "[j]oint and several
liability is not only consistent with the [RICO's] statutory scheme, but in
some cases will be necessary to achieve the aims of the legislation., 268 The
general rule for joint and several liability is that, "[e]ach of two or more
persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible
harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the
entire harm. 269
Applying this to P2P, each upload of a file and each successive
262. See United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that joinder of
codefendants involved in activities related to the RICO enterprise was proper if it tended to show
the existence of the enterprise).
263. See Download.com, at http://download.com.com/3101-2001-0-l.html?tag=pop (last
visited Nov. 10, 2003) (showing that the Kazaa Media Desktop, one of several Kazaa user
applications, had been downloaded 293,497,945 times through November 10, 2003).
See BMG Music v. Does 1-203, (order) (case no. 04-650) (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2004) available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA_vThePeople/JohnDoe/20040305_EDPAOrder.pdf (The court
ordered severance of the RIAA's suit against 203 P2P user defendants due to improper joinder);
see also Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, EFF.ORG at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php (detailing the various lawsuits in which the
RIAA is attempting joinder of large groups of Doe defendants, and providing copies of the
relevant court documents for each suit).
265. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (This rule permits members of a class to sue or be sued if: "(1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.").
266. See id. § 23(c)(3) (providing an opportunity for individual class members to exclude
themselves prior to approval of a class settlement).
267. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
268. United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1507 (11 th Cir. 1986) (applying joint and
several liability in a criminal RICO forfeiture case); see also Fleischhauer, 879 F.2d at 1301
(applying joint and several liability in a civil RICO suit).
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
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download is an infringement and hence, a divisible injury. Normally, joint
and several liability would not apply.270 However, joint and several
liability would apply in RICO suits. All defendants participate in the
enterprise that is "responsible for the RICO violations; awarding damages
separately between each plaintiff and defendant is inconsistent with the
nature of the injury [defendants] inflict[] and brings about a danger of
multiplying damages before they are trebled. '27' Since it is the enterprise,
as opposed to the individual defendants, that cause injuries, each injury is
caused by one entity making it indivisible, and thus, joint and several
liability applies. Where the enterprise caused the damages, plaintiffs need
not demonstrate that any individual caused any particular injury.272 This
makes proof of causation much simpler in what might otherwise be an
unmanageable case.
Fourth, RICO possesses an important cognitive advantage over
copyright infringement-the difference between describing P2P activity as
"racketeering" or as "sharing." The subtext of one is malevolent while the
other is courteous. Judges and juries will be strongly affected by this
difference and less likely to give "racketeers involved with organized
crime" the benefit of doubt that they might give to "people sharing files."
This cognitive difference will enhance the already intimidating threat of a
RICO claim and make defendants more likely to settle cases quickly.
Finally, one other possible benefit of a RICO claim is worth
discussing. In subsequent suits, plaintiffs may be able to invoke issue
preclusion against those who were defendants in earlier RICO actions.
Issue preclusion is a judge-made doctrine that precludes a party from
arguing an issue that was "actually litigated" and decided in a prior suit, as
long as the party to be estopped had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
273the issue. For example, if the RIAA establishes in one suit that a P2P
network like Kazaa and one set of 100 Kazaa users are a RICO enterprise,
the RIAA might not have to prove that issue again in a new suit against
Kazaa users. Instead, the RIAA would only need to prove the defendants'
relationship to the previously established RICO enterprise.
The constitutional problem with such use of issue preclusion is that
the new defendants had no opportunity to be heard in the first suit since
they were not parties to that action. However, a court may allow such
270. See generally id. (Because each of several downloads of a single sound recording
cause separate, divisible injuries of infringement to the copyright holders, joint and several
liability would not be applicable between those that downloaded the file.).
271. Fleischhauer, 879 F.2d at 1301.
272. See id. at 1300-01.
273. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979).
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preclusion if it follows the questionable doctrine of virtual
representation. 274 Under virtual representation, a court may permit issue
preclusion against a nonparty who was so well "represented by others that
his interest received actual and efficient protection." 275 The test is whether:
(1) the original parties were adequately represented; (2) the interests of the
non-parties were the same as those of the original parties; (3) the
substantive right of each was the same though different remedies were
available; and (4) the relief granted to the original plaintiffs would not have
changed character if the non-parties had been parties to the action.276
Basically, the plaintiffs would need to show that the favorable result
in the first suit would not have been any different had the new defendants
been parties to it. To do this, the plaintiffs in the first suit should select the
most egregious infringers as defendants (including the networks) so as to
guarantee that those defendants have at least as much at stake as defendants
in a subsequent suit. If plaintiffs can show that the original defendants
were adequately represented and that they vigorously litigated the
enterprise issue, plaintiffs maysucceed and avoid the need to prove a major
part of their case. In this way, plaintiffs would greatly reduce the length,
complexity, and cost of subsequent actions. Moreover, defendants in those
later suits would be much more likely to settle, reducing plaintiff's burden
further.
D. Disadvantages of the Civil RICO Strategy
It would be incomplete to discuss the benefits of RICO without
mentioning its shortcomings when compared to civil copyright
infringement litigation. First, civil copyright infringement allows for
injunctive relief, 277 whereas under RICO it is only available in some
jurisdictions.278 RICO does not specifically grant private equitable reliefY79
274. See Holden v. Marietta Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 656, 658 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
275. Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 741
(9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Rynsburger v. Dairymen's Fertilizer Coop., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).
276. See Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1995).
277. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000) ("Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising
under this title may, subject to the provisions of § 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright.").
278. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1986)
(discussing the disagreement between courts on this issue).
279. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (granting the district courts the power to provide injunctive
relief but not specifying if it is available to both the Attorney General and private parties).
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and circuit courts are split as to whether it is applicable.280 The issue was
before the Supreme Court in Scheidler v. NOW, Inc. in 2002, but the Court
dismissed the RICO claim without reaching the issue. 281 An injunction
would allow plaintiffs to bar P2P networks from distributing their software
within the United States, seemingly a great benefit to plaintiffs. Yet, this
may not stop a network from operating, for networks like Kazaa maintain
that even they do not have the power to prevent individuals from using its
application.2 82 Nonetheless, the eventual result of blocking distribution of
the software to new users would be the same as an injunction. In the trendy
world of P2P file sharing, once a network stops growing (by acquiring new
users) and begins losing ground to competitors, "its demise becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 283
Second, a civil RICO case against a P2P network and a large number
of its users poses what appears to be a logistical nightmare in terms of case
management. The RIAA must prove many more elements against many
more defendants than it is currently litigating in simple copyright
284actions. Yet, the RIAA has the financial backing of the major recording
companies so as to be able to undertake a major, complex suit such as
this.285
A third potential problem is that the plaintiffs would need to base
their RICO suit on so many indispensable questions of fact and law that the
result might be as fragile as a house of cards. If they fail on one element,
they could lose everything. Even if the RIAA succeeds, there would be no
lack of ammunition for appellate sharpshooters. Many of the legal
elements required to prove RICO liability have never been applied to P2P
technology, leaving such application open to judicial discretion. Although
plaintiffs are free to shop for the most favorable forum, there may be no
single jurisdiction that would find for the plaintiffs on each necessary
element. Conceptually, the most important question is whether RICO is at
all applicable to the facts of P2P file sharing-whether P2P users are
280. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 698 (7th Cir. 2001), rev'd
on other grounds (permitting equitable relief); see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 202 F.
Supp. 2d 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y 2002); but c.f Religious Tech. Ctr., 796 F.2d at 1082 (disallowing
injunctive relief).
281. Scheidler v. Nat'l. Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003) (dismissing the
predicate Hobbs Act claim which invalidated the RICO claim).
282. See Wu, supra note 64, at 735; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that both Grokster and Morpheus can continue to operate
even if the companies closed their doors).
283. Sandvine, supra note 66, at 5.
284. See Bryan, et al., supra note 103.
285. See MacMillan, supra note 11.
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racketeers. Not all courts would accept the definition of enterprise
discussed in Part III.B.2., nor find a sufficient structure to the organization.
The plaintiffs also would need to prove the willfulness of the individual
defendants,286 which may be an equally difficult task.
Many of the other issues discussed above have lesser importance to
the overall suit. It is not necessary to establish a defendant class; this is just
a matter of convenience and economics for the plaintiffs. Similarly,
plaintiffs would best place the doctrine of virtual representation on their
wish list. Overall, a RICO strategy is not without problems or
complexities, but properly executed it can provide a successful approach to
fighting P2P copyright infringement.
D. How RICO Would Have Benefited Plaintiffs in Current Lawsuits
1. MGM v. Grokster
On October 2, 2001, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios and twenty-
seven other entertainment companies filed suit for damages and injunctive
relief for copyright infringement against three P2P companies using
287FastTrack systems. A year and a half after the suit was filed, the court
ruled that the defendants were not liable for either contributory
infringement or vicarious liability.288 Citing Napster,289 the Grokster court
held that the "defendants are liable for contributory infringement only if
they (1) have specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they
contribute to the infringement, and (2) fail to act upon that information.,
290
Additionally, the defendants must be shown to have "engaged in personal
conduct that encourages or assists the infringement. '' 291  Although the
defendants had ample, actual knowledge of past copyright infringements,292
and were generally aware that many, if not most, of their users infringed,
there was no evidence that they had that knowledge at a time when they
286. See supra Part III.B. 1 .b.
287. See, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., (compl.), available at Electronic Frontier
Foundation,
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/20011002_mgmv grokstercomplaint.pdf; see
also Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-33 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (The only relevant defendants
remaining are Grokster, which still uses a branded version of the Kazaa user application, and
Streamcast Networks, whose application, Morpheus, utilizes the Gnutella network.).
288. See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
289. See Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
290. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
291. Id. (quoting Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019).
292. Id.
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could have acted to stop it.
2 93
The conduct necessary for contributory infringement must be
material, substantial, and have a direct relationship with the infringing
act. 294  Unlike Napster, which provided the site and facilities for
infringement 295 through its centralized servers, neither Grokster nor
Morpheus provided such services.296 The court held that there was no
evidence of the type of conduct necessary for liability.
297
It is easy to see the contrast between the rule of law for contributory
infringement in Grokster and that for a RICO conspiracy. Conspiracy's
two elements, agreement and knowledge,298 can be proven on Grokster's
facts. Both Grokster and Morpheus had actual knowledge of the
substantial infringing use of their software. 299 A RICO conspiracy only
requires knowledge of the "general nature of the conspiracy and that the
conspiracy extends beyond [the defendant's] individual role."300 It is not
necessary to have actual knowledge of any specific unlawful act.3 ' The
Grokster defendants had the general knowledge required at the time they
entered into EULA contracts with users. 30 2 Even though Grokster was well
aware that users would infringe, the company nevertheless agreed to allow
them to use the software. Whether the EULA included any conditions that
barred users from committing infringement is inconsequential.
Conspiracies are "characterized by secrecy,, 30 3 and such a condition only
enhances the conspirator's mission to hide its plot. Here, the natural
consequences of the agreement are reasonably foreseeable, unlawful acts of
copyright infringement. This is the type of accord that qualifies as a tacit
agreement to commit a predicate RICO act. All that is required is an
agreement for Grokster to "facilitate only some of the acts leading to the
substantive offense. 30 4 Providing users with a license and ability to use
the software is an act that facilitates the substantive offense.
More facts are necessary to prove network liability under aiding and
abetting. The first element, participation, requires the network to have
293. Id at 1037.
294. Id. at 1042.
295. Id. at 1041.
296. See id.
297. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
298. Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828.
299. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36.
300. Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828.
301. Id.
302. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
303. United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1944).
304. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997).
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taken some affirmative steps to aid the venture rather than simply allowing
it to flourish.3 °5 It may be enough to have simply marketed the software.
Without new users, the network (and thus, the RICO enterprise) quickly
dies. Hence, marketing and distributing the software is "affirmative
conduct designed to aid the venture.,
30 6
The second element of association requires that the defendants share
the same illicit purpose as the principal.3 °7  Since the purpose is
infringement, specific acts made by the software designers to promote
copyright infringement tend to prove this purpose. In addition, plaintiffs
can show that the profits derived from infringing activity provided a motive
for the networks to encourage -the purpose of infringement. This motive
along with acts taken to promote infringement, show that the networks
shared the same illicit purpose as the principal infringers.
Whether or not the RIAA could have proved aiding and abetting,
there is ample evidence that it could have succeeded in a conspiracy claim.
However, the RIAA would first have had to establish proof of direct
infringement through claims against the network's users.
2. Suits Against Individual Users
Conduct that satisfies criminal copyright infringement is not required
to establish RICO liability against an individual. It is only necessary for
the RIAA to prove that at least two individuals violated the criminal statute
in order to establish the pattern of racketeering activity. 308 Other users may
then be found liable based on: (1) their association with the enterprise,
established by loading the P2P client software on their computer; (2) their
conduct or participation in the enterprise, shown by evidence of uploading
or downloading copyrighted material; 309 or (3) their use of the P2P
software if it facilitated the infringement and affected the enterprise. 310
Plaintiffs can demonstrate this by inference from the interdependent
relationship between uploading and downloading in a P2P network.
Alternatively, the RIAA has the option of using secondary liability
theories in suits against users. While this reduces the RIAA's burden of
proof, it does not reduce the defendant's liability. For aiding and abetting,
users can become associated with the criminal venture by downloading an
305. See supra Part III.B.4.b.
306. Vasquez, 953 F.2d at 183.
307. Graham, 858 F.2d at 992.
308. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
309. Id. § 1962(c).
310. Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1992).
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infringing file, assuming that they have the same intent as the person that
uploaded it. Uploading files demonstrates affirmative conduct designed to
aid the venture.
As was the case with networks, conspiracy imposes a lighter burden
on plaintiffs. Uploading files is a tacit agreement with all other users
permitting them to copy the infringing files provided in a sharing folder. 311
Knowledge of the general nature of the network as an open avenue for free
copyrighted files is the only other requirement.1 2
Individual defendants who may have considered defending
themselves against the RIAA's suits for civil copyright infringement would
be more likely to settle a civil RICO suit. Defendants risk treble damage
awards and, if found liable, would have to pay reasonable attorney's
fees.313  In suits joining multiple defendants, the stakes mount for
challengers with deep pockets because of joint and several liability.
Defendants with money will pay for codefendants who are judgment-proof.
The teenagers and college students who heavily populate the P2P user
world 314 are not the ideal candidates for judgment collections.
The RIAA's encouragement of good faith settlements315 exacerbates
the problems of potential challengers by raising the ante in a court fight.
Consider the following hypothetical situation. After establishing in a prior
suit that infringing users of Kazaa form an enterprise, the RIAA initiates a
new RICO lawsuit with claims against 110 users for the nominal amount of
$550,000 ($5,000 each if tried separately). If the first 100 settle for $2000
each, the remaining ten will be liable for the $350,000 left unpaid by those
that settled. Among the ten challengers, only two are not judgment-proof.
If they lose in court, those two will be responsible together for paying
$340,000 for their codefendants. Now, multiplying that figure by three for
the treble damage award and adding the RIAA's attorney fees, their
liability rises to well over $1 million. Anyone with both assets and
common sense will quickly settle rather than attempt a defense. This is
more than an incentive to settle; it borders on coercion.
If defendants decide that they must go to court, they would be facing
racketeering charges rather than copyright infringement. The negative
connotation associated with involvement in organized crime is bound to
produce a cognitive difference if not in a defendant's willingness to settle,
311. See, e.g., Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65.
312. See Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828 (2d Cir. 1989).
313. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
314. In re: Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
315. Associated Press, supra note 166..
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then in a jury's inclination to find for the plaintiffs. 3 1 6 A jury award of any
amount will immediately add on liability for all co-parties plus attorney
fees. As a result, an award for one dollar could cost a defendant one
million. Users are likely to settle as soon as they can to avoid this.
E. The Problem With Using the Bomb to Control Your Termite Situation
Although the million-dollar judgment against a person who may have
caused less than a hundred dollars worth of actual injury seems grossly
unfair, it is hard to fit such a round peg squarely into the constitutional
limits of either excessive fines or punitive damages. Nevertheless, the
height of such an inequity may give an appellate court a better view to see
such an action as fitting one or the other well enough.
The first issue is whether recent holdings limiting punitive damage
awards from juries could be applicable to RICO awards. The Third Circuit
has held that RICO's treble damages and mandatory attorney's fees awards
are punitive although there is considerable debate on this issue.317 The
Supreme Court has stated in dicta that RICO's treble damages have a
"remedial function," 318 without denying that they also function punitively.
The Court also noted that it has "placed different statutory treble-damages
provisions on different points along the spectrum between purely
compensatory and strictly punitive awards." 319 Clarifying this recently, the
Court stated that "treble damages have a compensatory side, serving
remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives. 320
Although treble damage awards are, at least in part, punitive, they are
not excessive by themselves.321 Courts properly impose punitive damages
to serve the legitimate purposes of deterring unlawful conduct and
322punishing culpable actors. The question is whether a legitimate purpose
316. But cf Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 (stating the Supreme Court's view that the stigma of
being named a racketeer "leaves no greater stain than do a number of other civil proceedings.").
317. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 914 (3d Cir. 1991); but c.f E. Thomas
Sullivan, Antitrust Regulation of Land Use: Federalism's Triumph Over Competition, The Last
Fifty Years, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 473, 506 (discussing the dispute over whether treble
damage awards are punitive or compensatory).
318. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987) (discussing the
treble damages in the RICO Act).
319. Id. (quoting PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531, 1535 (2003)).
320. Cook County v. United States et rel. Chandler, 123 S. Ct. 1239, 1246 (2003)
(emphasis added).
321. See BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581-82 n.33 & 34 (1996) (using
RICO's treble damages as an example of awards that bear a reasonable relationship between
compensatory and punitive awards).
322. See Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519.
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is served by imposing what may be viewed as joint and several punishment.
It is one thing to hold a member of a RICO enterprise liable for the injuries
caused by the others. It is another thing to hold one person liable for the
punishment meant for their cohorts. It is a far different thing to hold
someone liable for others' punishment if that individual has no notice of
the extent of their liability.
Awarding treble damages in this context may invoke constitutional
issues of fairness and equity, as it is well established that "a person [must]
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
,,323impose. This concern is addressed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which proscribes "the imposition of grossly
excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.' '324 This clause mirrors
that of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to federal, rather than
state, laws.325 Thus, a grossly excessive or arbitrary punishment imposed
by a federal court would similarly violate the due process rights of the
defendant.
The first inquiry in determining whether a punitive award is excessive
is to see whether the legislature had a legitimate purpose. 32 6 The question
here is whether Congress had a legitimate interest in holding P2P users
jointly and severally liable for the trebled damages caused by other P2P
users within the same RICO enterprise. The laws needed to link P2P
activity to RICO (the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of
1996327 and the NET Act of 1997328) were enacted before Napster and P2P
file sharing were invented.329 Thus, it is hard to say that Congress had any
intention of creating a law to combat something that did not yet exist.
Although, plaintiffs may fail this first step, courts are very deferential in
determining congressional intent.330  It may suffice to hypothesize that
Congress intended to criminalize a type of similar activity-downloading
323. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
324. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519-20.
325. U.S. CONST. amend. V (No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .. "); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (stating
that the parallel clauses within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments operate analogously).
326. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
327. Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996) (adding criminal copyright
infringement, 18 U.S.C. § 2319, to the list of RICO predicate offenses found at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(B)).
328. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (criminalizing infringement activity that
had no profit motive).
329. See Sandvine, supra note 66, at 2.
330. See, e.g., Sedima 473 U.S. at 501.
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files from a warez site-and that P2P is merely a more sophisticated
version of this type.
The next step is to determine whether the award is so arbitrary and
excessive in relation to the interests it serves that the award violates due
process.331 In State Farm v. Campbell,332 the Supreme Court set forth three
criteria for making this determination: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award;
and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 333
The first and most important factor, reprehensibility,334 clearly weighs
in favor of the defendant in P2P cases. In such a case, the harm caused was
not physical, the conduct did not threaten the health or safety of others, the
target was not vulnerable, and though the conduct involved repeated
actions, there was no malicious intention to injure the recording industry.335
A full analysis of all factors would belabor the point that plaintiffs would
be hard-pressed to sustain a large award against a minor infringer.
It may also be possible to attack such an award as a violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 336  "[A] punitive
forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional
to the gravity of a defendant's offense. 337 That clause's primary purpose
has "always been considered ... to be directed at the method or kind of
punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes."
338
In order to invoke this clause, which would seem to apply only to
criminal proceedings, the defendant must demonstrate such a close
correlation between RICO civil remedies and criminal prosecutions that it
would warrant stretching the Eighth Amendment to cover a civil suit.
Alternatively, defendants may show that RICO civil suits fall under the
"state action" doctrine by arguing that there is government endorsement of
331. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
332. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
333. Id. at 1520.
334. Id. at 1521.
335. Id. (explaining the factors in determining reprehensibility).
336. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
337. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (overturning the forfeiture of
$357,144 for a violation of a reporting offense punishable by a fine of $5,000).
338. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968).
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private discriminatory acts339 or that the plaintiffs in these suits are taking
on the traditional role of government.340
In support of such a position, defendants may argue that Congress
intended the civil remedies of RICO to be an extension of the government's
overall scheme to fight organized crime. 341 The same conduct that creates
civil liability also creates criminal liability. Thus, if the government were
to impose grossly excessive fines against minimally culpable perpetrators,
their actions might well be unconstitutional.
If defendants succeed in establishing that the Eighth Amendment is
applicable to civil RICO suits, they can proceed with the same arguments
as in the due process analysis, above. Courts consider the same three
criteria to determine whether a punitive award is excessive under the
Eighth Amendment as under the Due Process Clause.342 Although neither
argument is a close fit with the circumstances of this hypothetical case, the
inequity could be so great that it would persuade a court to lean further than
normal to seek justice.
Perhaps, a stronger argument for defendants is that Congress did not
intend P2P activity to be a RICO predicate crime. Congress made
copyright infringement a RICO predicate act in 1996 to fight
counterfeiting. 343 It amended the Copyright Act to criminalize activity on
warez sites in 1997. Two years later, Napster launched and introduced
the concept of P2P file sharing.345 Congress could not have intended harsh
criminal and civil penalties to apply to something that had not yet been
conceived.
Courts have been reluctant to expand protections under copyright law
339. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967); but cf Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that state endorsement of a facially neutral law that is discriminatory in
practice does not implicate state action).
340. See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 577 U.S. 186, 271 (1996).
341. Sedima, 473 U.S. 487 (quoting U.S. Representative Steiger speaking on the merits of
RICO's proposed treble damage remedy, "the availability of such a remedy would enhance the
effectiveness of title IX's prohibitions."). Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals, before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 520 (1970);
see also Sedima, at 488 (stating the view of RICO sponsor Senator McClellan that the treble
damages "provision would be 'a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of organized
crime in our economic life."' 116 CONG. REC. 25190(1970).
342. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001) (stating that
the same analysis is used in Bajakjian as in Gore).
343. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat.
1386 (1996) (adding criminal copyright infringement, 18 U.S.C. § 2319, to the list of RICO
predicate offenses found at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B)); see also MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 15.05.(B).
344. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
345. See supra Part II.C.
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without a clear mandate from Congress.346 Such an expansion of copyright
protection upsets the balance between granting artists an incentive to create
works and the primary objective of copyright law which "lie[s] in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." 347 This
reluctance is especially resolute when courts are dealing with new
technologies.348 Thus, before applying existing laws to P2P cases, a court
may require a more searching inquiry into the intent of Congress.
A weak link in the plaintiffs case exists where Congress is most
vague, leaving room for judicial interpretation. The definition of "willful,"
the state of mind required for the predicate act of criminal copyright
infringement,349 is a case in point. Since Congress did little to delineate the
requirements for acting willfully, courts may require more, such as the
defendant's knowledge that the activity was not just infringement, but
criminal. 350 A lesser burden could impermissibly expand the protections of
the Copyright Act in an area where courts are without the capacity to
determine Congressional intent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Civil RICO is a viable cause of action in the recording industry's fight
against P2P copyright infringement. Chief among the many benefits the
RIAA would enjoy by using RICO is a reduced burden to prove P2P
networks' liability. Currently, the RIAA may be too wedded to its strategy
to consider using RICO. But, mounting expenses or courtroom defeats
may provide justification to change its course. Specifically, if the RIAA
should lose its appeal against Grokster, it should file a RICO claim based
on new instances of copyright infringement. The RIAA should also
employ RICO in the future against other P2P networks.
RICO also permits a much more efficient system for the RIAA to
battle P2P users. It can unite large numbers of suits into one, select any
346. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 431; LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 544.
347. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932).
348. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 544.
349. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a); see also supra Part Ill.B.l.b.
350. 143 CONG. REC. S 12689 (Nov. 13, 1997) (Remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch regarding the
interpretation of "willful" within the proposed NET Act: "I am also relying upon the good sense
of prosecutors and judges. Again, the purpose of the bill is to prosecute commercial scale
pirates who do not have commercial advantage or private financial gain from their illegal
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forum, and wield a big stick to force settlements. However, the RIAA
should act prudently and within limits. Plaintiffs should not be so
encouraged by the ease with which defendants settle that they start aiming
their RICO suits beyond the most egregious violators whose conduct might
warrant the severe penalties. Large judgments against moderate users
resulting from the combined effects of joint and several liability, treble
damages, and mandatory attorney fee awards could produce great
inequities. Judgments could be so unfair that they would violate
constitutional bounds or lead courts to increase the plaintiffs' burden of
proof.
The RAA may have invested too much time, effort, and money in its
current strategy to change course in midstream. This is not true of the
Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"). The movie industry
recently decided to begin preparing lawsuits against file sharers. 351 MPAA
President Jack Valenti has cited research showing that P2P users illegally
download 350,000 to 750,000 movies every day in the U.S. alone. 352 The
MPAA should implement the most effective and efficient litigation strategy
by exploiting the rich benefits of civil RICO.
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